.NDIw.NTc3
ALS (5?)
Ewell Papers August 17, 1885
39.1 (391?) Ewell, Benjamin S., Williamsburg, Va.
EW 3 to Colonel Thomas Tash(k?)er Gantt 7 p.
Folder 5 Reply to Harriet's letter concerning
Peninsula Campaign articles in
"The Century" magazine. Joe Johnston
fair and able; writes from different view
than Ewell. Johnston missed opportunity
in not fighting pitched and decisively
at Williamsburg. Details of battle.
Opinions on Seven Day's Battles. None
of the generals equal to Caesar etc.
Lee's errors.
(1)
August 17, 1885
Colonel Thomas T. Gantt,
My Dear Tasker, In
a letter, Harriet sent me a half a sheet
of a recent letter from you to her
in which I was much interested. As
there was nothing in what she sent
but was related to the war & the
recent articles on it in the "Century" I
trust you do not object to my [seeing?] it.
Being tolerably familiar with operations
in the Peninsula in 1861 & 62 most of the Century
articles, on them were most attractive. Joe Johnston
& Dr. H. Hill, in the Southern & Fitz John Porter
& Franklin on the Federal side were able
& in my estimate, fair. Johnston's & Porter's
were particularly so. Johnston,
though, did not write of the Battle [here?]
as I would have done. By
not farthing [strikethrough] fighting a pitched & decisive
battle with McClellan at Williamsburg he
missed an opportunity not often offered
to Military Commanders. He had 55000 men
about & a strong line of redoubts 3 1/2 miles in
length at (this is a strikethrough) half of them covered by swamps
& mill ponds too difficult for a "coup de main"
leaving less than 2 miles [ ] for a large
attacking force to approach in. Then for a distance
of 8 miles below Williamsburg, there
were but two road in which McClellan
could advance, or retreat, & these two roads
converged into one a short distance
below the Redoubts - the land bordering
on the roads being covered with an
undergrowth almost as dense as the
Mexican Chapparal - and further
there were two possible roads each
defended by a strong redoubt - leading
from the Confederate lines - to points
in the Yorktown & Warwick roads
(2)
a mile, or a mile & a half, below
these lines. Johnston had enough men
to man the redoubts, to resist McClellan
in front - to send a flanking force to
attack both his Flanks, to form
a sufficient reserve, & to furnish a detachment
to repel any threatened movement
up York River & McClellan had not
space enough to handle his Army
within 2 miles of the objective
points. The very numbers McClellan
had [strikethrough] would have served to [strikethrough] increase
the confusion incident to such a battle, &
to have converted an attack, not entirely
successful, into a disastrous retreat.
Before Johnston came with his army
to the Peninsula, I told [those?]
with whom I conversed on the subject,
that the greatest battle ever, up to that
time, fought in America, would be on
this very ground. Instead of [strikethrough] this battle the redoubts
of the left of the Confederate lines were
abandoned on Sunday night in the
very face of an enemy. Hancock the
next day, during the battle, occupied
some of them - one particularly which
commanded the Confederate Center, &
part of the right - knowing the ground
well - having located [one?], and advised
as to some of the other redoubts, I do not
think my assertions can be contradicted.
Having, myself, conducted the troops
that occupied the Redoubts in the left, I
know they were fully garrisoned up to
10 Oclock Sunday night & have never
heard that Hancock had any fighting
to do while entering them on Monday. I
think I am right then in saying Johnston
lost a great opportunity. It is true he
(3)
might have been defeated, & badly so,
but as you indicate in your letter
to Harriet "nothing venture nothing
won" in War as in other things. I
knew much less of the ground near
to Richmond where the 7 Days battles
were fought yet something about
Coal Harbor & more about Malvern Hall -
and [strikethrough] I believe that McClellan & Lee had
in those 7 Days each one by the throat
of the other - 1st one & then the other, more
than once. I thought in those days Porter
was one of the best on the Federal side [strikethrough]
what I read, [now?], confirms my opinion.
How any of the American Generals can
be talked about as if they compared
with Alexander or Caesar or Napoleon
or Malborough, or, perhaps, Wellington,
or certainly Von Moltke - is more than I
can conceive. Gen Lee began the 7 Days with a
serious blunder attacking the Beaver Dam
Works 24 hours too soon, losing men
& morale. At Coal Harbor, if McClellan
had sent his whole army to the
aid of Porter, Lee would have been
defeated & Richmond would have
been taken. If Lee had concentrated his army
at Frazier's Farm ˆ Monday McClellan would have
been routed. If McClellan had stuck
to Malvern Hills, after the battle Tuesday, the
attacks on him would have been [minimized?]
and the Confederate army would have
been dashed to pieces & if Lee had closely
followed McClellan early on Wednesday morning,
without attacking till Harrison's Landing
was reached, McClellan would have
been [worsted?], if not destroyed. [However?] I was
told by Gen Barnard & other officers
of McClellan's army. Tis ridiculous
to talk about the strategy of either side.
As it seemed to me, the [strikethrough] parts
of each army, after Coal Harbor & till Malvern Hills stumbled
about, & fought when they stumbled against
each other without any especial
object, except that on one side the
[strikethrough] goal was James River & on the other
to prevent the 1st from reaching the
goal. The 1st side making more coherent
attempts than the other. What Gen Sherman
told you of Grant being a natural Gamester [explains?]
to me something I never, before, understood. I
told Johnston more than once in the Stanton Campaign
in 1864, that if Grant had been in
command instead of Sherman the campaign
[strikethrough] would have been not half so long &
[that?] Grant would have sacrificed his army
by incautious attacks. A mistake in front
of an adversary [strikethrough] so observant [strikethrough] ˆ as Johnston
& so careful in keeping his troops in hand, so
as not to be compelled to wait a couple
of days before he could concentrate his
(4)
army might have been attacked with
very serious results. I wish I could
follow your advice & write more
plainly. The habit is too inveterate.
In March, I think, I got a letter from you
& I have kept it near me to answer,
but, as I have done before, I put it
off till the I had nothing to say
though I was full enough when I
read it. Harriet has been constantly
improving slowly for a year. It is
doubtful when where she will go when she
leaves Rockbridge. I trust your health
is better than it was some months ago.
and I remain,
Your affectionately
Benj. S. Ewell