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ington, and what I state here is not mere spec= ulation. General Johnston, who had resided in Washington for several years, doubtless was acquainted with the difficulties to be en= countered on reaching the Potomac, and he was

               able

therefore better ^ to decide what he could do, than those enthusiastic persons who imagined that all that necessary, was for us to have marched to the banks of the Potomac, when Washington City, with the approaches to it intact, would have been aban= doned to us by a panic stricken army and Gov= ernment. I have heard some wiseacres re= mark that , if we had gone on, we could have entered pell-mell with the enemy into Washington. To have done that, if possible, we would have had to keep up with the enemy, and I dont suppose any one would say that a solitary soldier of our army could have reached the banks of the Potomac by day= light on the morning after the battle. It is possible to cross a short bridge of the few yards, or enter through the gates of a city pell-mell with an enemy, but no one ever heard or read of that thing being done over a bridge more than a mile in length with a draw raised in the middle. Yet this idea is not more absurd than the one that the enemy would have abandoned the city to us.

The truth is that while the enemy’s retreat was very disorderly and disgraceful, none of his troops retained their organization, and things in Wash=

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ington were not quite as bad as represented. If we had advanced, Alexandria would probably have fallen into our hands without a struggle, and we might have forced the enemy to evacuate Arlington Heights, but probably not until after a fight in which the object loss would

                    the object

have been greater than ^ to be gained would have jus= tified. We might have transferred our line tem= porarily to the banks of the Potomac, but we could not have held it, and the attempt would have resulted in damage to us.

Had our army been in condition to make an invasion into Maryland and Pennsylvania by the upper fords of the Potomac, after the 1st battle of Manassas, that might have been done with advantage. But that was out of the question as the army was smaller than generally supposed and very raw, and all of it

                         Army

except that part from the valley of the Shenandoah, unused to marching. Its organization was incom= plete, and neither officers or men had learned to sub= mit to the privations which an active campaign would have entailed.

So much for the question as between the generals and the cavillers. But there is another phase of it, in which an attempt has been made, by an injudicious champion of General Beauregard, to raise an issue between him and the Authorities at Richmond. I have before stated that General Johnston was the responsible commander, and it follows that this

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The point sought to be made, is that Washington could have been taken, if the President had caused the Secretary of War, and the heads of the Quarter Master and Commissary depart= ments to furnish transportation and supplies, but it is admitted that Mr. Davis left the question of an advance entirely to the Generals. It is presumed that the govern= ment furnished all the transportation and supplies it could, and the former had to be obtained from the farmers of Virginia, as it was impossible to have had waggons man= ufactured at so early a day. But we had trans= portation enough to carry all the ammunition and cooking utensils needed, and to gather in provisions. If the bridges on the rail-road had not been burned by us, we might have moved our depot to Alexandria as the army moved, if we could have advanced to that point, the enemy having repaired the road to Fairfax Station, and not having interfered with it on his retreat. If we could have crossed the Potomac, we could have procured an abundance of transportation and provisions in Maryland from the citizens if we had not taken them from the enemy, which would probably have been the case if an advance had been practicable otherwise. In 1862, 1863, and 1864, these pre= tended difficulties of 1861 about supplies, when we were going into the enemy’s country, were no difficulties at all. It is therefore an useless issue which is sought to be made. The want of supplies or transportation did not furnish the real dif=

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ter the 1st battle of Manassas.

The forgoing observations are such as my expe= rience subsequent to the battle, have enabled me to make, and I do not pretend that the tithe of them occurred to me at the time.

Both of our Generals, notwithstanding their inexpe= rience in command, displayed extraordinary energy and capacity in thwarting the plans of a veteran com= mander whom the country, at that time, generally regarded as one of the ablest military chieftains of the age. If they did not accomplish all that might have been accomplished by an experienced com= mander with an army of veterans, they are not therefore to be condemned; and it is equally unjust to attempt to shift the responsibility to the shoulders of the Government in Richmond.