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Cocke’s was smaller. The enemy had engaged, two whole divisions of infantry, and three brigades of another, besides his artillery.

Claims were put forward in behalf of several commands, for the credit of having saved the day and secured the victory. Persons engaged in a subordi= nate capacity, very often imagined that what they saw constituted the whole of a battle, and hence it was not uncommon for them to suppose that their commands did the greater part of the fighting. Staff officers were very much disposed to fall into this error, and very naturally entertaining a preferred

                                             thought

admiration for their immediate chiefs, they think ^ that they were generally entitled to the lion’s share of the glory. It was by no means uncommon for them to give vent to their feelings in communications to the news= papers, which of course were eagerly published, and this was the fruitful source of much of the erroneous infor= mation given to the public during the war.

It is very surprising to see what errors often prevail among well informed men, in regard to the relative merits of different commands which take part in a battle. If a small force has been fighting for hours against great odds, until it has become exhausted and is begin= ning to give way, and then fresh troops come up and turn the tide of battle, these latter are said to have saved the day and often reap all the glory – yet

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where hard fighting held the enemy in check long enough to enable the fresh ones to come up?

At the battle of Manassas, but for the cavalry which watched the enemy’s movements and gave notice, so that Evans could move to the left, the day would probably have been lost at the outset – But for Evans’ prompt move= ment to our left and the obstinate fighting of his men, the enemy would have reached the hills on which our final line of battle was formed, thus turning our left completely and necessitating a rapid pulling back from

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the line of Bull Run, which would most probably ^ resulted in a disastrous defeat. This would have likewise been the case had not Bee arrived to the assistance of Evans when he did, and stayed the progress of the enemy. When Bee and Evans were forced back across the War=

                                    lost

renton Pike, the day would have been ^ if Jackson had not arrived most opportunely and enabled them to rally behind him. But for our artillery, our infantry could not have stood the shock of the enemy’s attacking columns. The arrivals of Hampton with his Legion, Smith with the 49th Va., Cocke’s two regiments, and Bonham’s two regiments, all seemed to stem the tide of battle and stay defeat; and none did better service than Stuart on the left with his two com= panies of cavalry and Beckham’s guns; But still, in all probability, the day would have been lost, but for the arrival of Smith with Elzey’s brigade.

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Elzey to our left, at what was probably the crisis of the battle. I do not claim that my brigade won or saved the day, but I do say that it was very appa= rent that its arrival at the moment when it came on the field, and the cool and deliberate manner in which my ^ men formed into line, in sight of the enemy and under fire, and advanced against him, had a material af= fect in checking the last attempt to flank our line,

            ta

and in precipi^ting the retreat. All the troops engaged were necessary to prevent defeat and secure victory,

     command

and each ^ in its proper sphere may be said to have saved the day; but it is manifestly improper to give all the credit or the greater part of it to any one command.

The concentration of Johnston’s and Beauregard’s troops against McDowell was a piece of masterly strategy, and our Generals showed very great ability in meeting and defeating the enemy’s unexpected movement against our left flank.

McDowell reached Centreville on the 18th, the day is which General Johnston commenced his movement from the Valley, and it is difficult to comprehend the delay in making the attack, by which two armies were permitted to be concentrated against the Federal Commander.

So far as McDowell is concerned, there is to be found a very ready excuse in the fact that he was inexperienced in command – having before served in the field only as a staff officer, but General Scott an old soldier

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mication with McDowell, who had been his aide and was selected to carry out his plans. General Scott was in fact the commander and McDowell merely his representative on the field. The former was the respon= sible man, and to his name must be attached the dis= credit for the failure of the Federals at Bull Run.

Had McDowell thrown his whole force against our centre on the 18th, when Tyler advanced against Black= burn’s Ford, our line must have been broken and defeat to us must have followed, for our troops were too much scattered to have furnished sufficient resistance to the enemy’s overwhelming fire, or enabled us to make an effective attack on his flanks. By delay this opportunity was lost, and two armies were concen= trated against him. General Scott ought to have anticipated this, and known that he was not fighting Mexicans. He cannot be excused by throwing the blame on Patterson, for he ought to have known that it was perfectly practicable for Johnston to slip away

         him

from ^Patterson and attack McDowell before Patter= son could get to his assistance. No, the operations at Manassas show that, while General Scott was a pains-taking soldier, who, after carefully preparing all his plans, with the aid of talented and enterprising lieutenants, could win victories from such soldiers as the Mongrel breeds of Mexico furnished, yet he was lacking in the essential element [ rest of line cut off on scan]

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ministration at Washington did very well to get rid of him.

In regard to McDowell, I will say that he made an honest effort to conduct the war on the principles of hu= manity and civilization, and expressed a very honest indignation at the excesses committed by his troops. In a dispatch from Fairfax C.H. dated 18th July, he said: “I am distressed to have to report excesses by our troops. The excitement of the men found vent in burning and pillaging, which however was soon checked. It dis=

        all

tessed us ^ greatly!!. On the same day he issued an order containing some very stringent rules on the subject,

                 among them

and the following language: “Any persons found commit= ting the slightest depredation, killing pigs or poultry, or trespassing on the property of the inhabitants, will be reported to these head-quarters, and the least that will be done to them will be to send them to the Alexandria jail. It is again ordered that no one shall arrest or attempt to arrest any citizen not in arms at the time, or search or attempt to search any house, or even to enter the same without permission. The troops must behave them= selves with as much forbearance and propriety as if they were at their own homes. They are here to fight the

                                     the

enemies of the country, not to punish ^ unarmed and defenceless, however guilty they may be. When necessary, that will be done by the proper person.”

“By command of General McDowell

Jas B. Fry Assistant Adjutant General”

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exhumed from the records of the past, for the purpose of being compared with the subsequent practise under Butler, Hunter, Pope, Sheridan, Sherman, [et id omne genus?] Nay, this war order of McDowell might very well be commended to the consideration of the District Com= manders under the peace policy of the present time.

The order did not prevent the burning of the entire vil= lage of Germantown near Fairfax C.H., and other outrages, but the citizens generally agreed that McDowell had en= deavored to prevent excesses by his troops; and it gives me pleasure to make this statement, as it is the last time I will have occasion to make a similar one in regard to any of the Federal Commanders. General McDowell evidently was not aware of the fact, that “John Brown’s soul was marching on” in company with his troops.

Pursuit of the enemy was not made after the battle in order to capture Washington or cross the Po= tomac, and as this mission has been made the subject of much comment and criticism, I will make some observations on that head.

In the first place, it must be recollected that our Generals were inexperienced in command. The highest capacity in which general Johnston had served in the field, had been as Lieut. Colonel of a mounted regiment, and he had just come from the head of the Quarter master’s Depart= ment on a peace establishment. Beauregard had [beginning of line cut off] held as a Lieutenant of Engineers. It is