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hospitals in the immediate vicinity, and I am able to state that the report made, by a committee of the Federal Congress in the year 1862, about “rebel activities” alleged to have been committed on the dead and wounded of the Federal Army after this battle, is false in its facts and its inferences.
I have now stated what I saw and did during the 1st Battle of Manassas, but as many preposterous accounts were given of that battle by newspaper correspondents in both [sections?], which have been the foundation for most of the descriptions of it contained even in works professing to be au= thentic histories, I will here give a succinct view of the general features of the battle from authentic sources.
On the morning of the 21st we held the line of Bull, with our right at Union Mills, and our left on Stone Bridge over the turnpike from Centreville to Warrenton. Ewell’s brigade was at Union Mills, Jones’ at McLean’s Ford, Longstreet’s at Blackburn’s Ford, Bonham’s at Mitchell’s Ford, Cocke’s at a Ford a short distance below Stone Bridge, and Evans with Sloan’s regiment and Wheat’s battalion at Stone Bridge. My brigade was in reserve to support Longstreet or Jones as might be required,
- two brigades of Johnston’s, Jackson’s and Bee’s
which had arrived by the Manassas Gap rail-road, were held as a general reserve to be used a occasion
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might require, and Holmes’ brigade, which had arrived from Aquia Creek, was some distance in rear of Ewell’s position. The main body of the Federal Army under McDowell had been con= centrated at Centreville prior to the movement begun on this morning. The turnpike from Centreville to Warrenton crossed Bull run at Stone Bridge, and its general direction from Centreville towards Warrenton was a little south of west.
Contrary to the expectation of General Beauregard, McDowell, instead of advancing against our center at Mitchell’s Ford, on the direct road from Centreville to Manassas Junction, left one division and a brigade of another to hold Centreville and amuse our right and centre, while he moved with two divisions (Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s) and three brigades of another (Tyler’s) against our left, with the view of turning that flank and forcing us from the line of Bull Run. This movement began before day-break on the morning of the 21st, and the three brigades of Tyler’s division moved directly against Stone Bridge and opened an artillery fire at 6 o’clock A.M. Hunter’s division moved across Bull Run at or near Sudley Mills above Stone Bridge, and then towards Manassas for the purpose of getting in rear of the bridge, while Heintzelman followed Hunter to support him. When the movement by Hunter was discovered, Colonel Evans, leaving a small force of artillery to hold stone Bridge where the road had been blocked up, moved to the left to meet the enemy and encountered Hunter’s advance
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its
North of the Warrenton Pike, sustaining the attack for some time, until overwhelming numbers were accumulated against him, when, as he was being forced back, Bee came to his assistance. Bee and Evans stayed the enemy’s advance until Heintzelman’s division united with Hunter’s and two divisions brigades of Tyler’s division crossed above Stone Bridge, when, though fighting with great obstinacy, there were forced back across the Warrenton Pike to a ridge south of, and nearly parallel to it. Here they were re-inforced by Jackson’s brigade, when a new line was formed, and the fight renewed. Subsequently, two of Cocke’s regiments were brought into action as also Hampton’s Legion, the 49th Va. Regiment under
Smith
Colonel ^, and two of Bonham’s regiments under Colonel Kershaw, but I am not able to state the order in which these commands came on the field. A number of our batteries had been engaged from the beginning and did most excellent service. The fighting was very stubborn on the part of our troops, who were opposed to larger odds, and the fortunes of the day fluctuated from time to time. At a most critical juncture, three regiments of Elzey’s brigade, which had arrived at the Junction by the rail-road and been moved promptly to the field under the direction of Brigadier General E. Kirby Smith, came up in rear of our line and, after General Smith had been wounded, were moved to our left under the command of Colonel Elzey, just in time to meet and repulse a body of the enemy which had overlapped that flank. A very short time afterwards, my brigade arrived and operated on the
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left of Elzey’s, as has been stated, and the enemy com= menced his retreat. He had been repulsed but not routed when, however, the retreat begun it soon degenerated into a rout of the main body of the troops which had been engaged on the enemy’s side, from their panic stricken faces, as they imagined that legions of cavalry were thundering at their heels, when there were only a few companies acting without much concert. Kershaw’s, two regiments and a portion
our
of ^ cavalry moved in pursuit for two or three miles, and made some captures, but the mass of our troops which had been engaged were not in a condition to pursue at once. Ewell’s and Holmes’ brigades had been sent for from the right, but they did not arrive until after the battle was over, and were sent back to their former positions.
I have thus given an outline of the battle as it took place, and have not gone into a consideration of the plans which were said to have miscarried on account of a miscarriage of orders, nor have I undertaken to give a detail of what the several commands did. For these refer= ence must be had to the reports of their commanders.
There are several popular delusions in regard to this battle, which are contained in the writings of many authors at home and abroad. One of them, which is almost universal, is contained in the oft-repeated statement that Kirby Smith, while passing over the Manassas Gap rail-road with his command, heard the firing and stopped the cars at once, when he moved di=
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rectly for the battle field, coming upon the rear of the ene= my’s right flank. This is entirely without foundation in fact, and it is astonishing to see with what pertinacity the statement is adhered to, in the teeth of the official reports, by persons who ought to know better. Kirby Smith’s command consisted of Elzey’s brigade, three regi= ments of which only were in the battle, and they moved up from the Junction to the rear of our centre, and then to our left to confront the enemy’s right. My brigade went to the left of Elzey’s, and none of our troops got to the enemy’s rear at any time, unless it may be when Colonel Stuart made a gallant charge with two companies of cavalry during the progress of the action. A reference to the official reports of Generals Johnston and Beauregard, and to the very clear report of Colonel Elzey, who was very properly promoted for his conduct on this occasion, will verify the cor= rectness of the forgoing statements, and the fallacy of those com= monly received as true. My statements are not made to deprive any one of a justly earned fame, but to rec= tify a matter of history. Smith and Elzey were both en= titled to very great credit for what they actually did.
I think that it very probable that the misapprehension arose from the fact that it was known that Smith had arrived with Elzey’s brigade at a most opportune moment, and the further fact that my brigade, followed by Cocke’s regiment, was seen moving along
the retreat
our front from the extreme left, immediately after ^ began, in the direction in which Smith would have come had he left
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for the enemy, and I was informed that fire was about being opened on us by some of our batteries, when one of our flags was recognized. It is probable that collectors of news for the papers, eager to furnish the first information, may have jumped to their conclusions from hearing detached facts, without making any investigation of their correctness, and thus originated this one report, and the other ^ that when Beauregard saw Smith’s approaching column, he gave directions for a retreat which were countermanded on discovering the Confederate flag. Certain it is, that first impressions made by newspaper articles have a most wonderful hold on the public mind, and it is exceedingly difficult to eradicate them.
Another error in regard to this battle, which is not uncommon and is given in several published works, is the statement that ^ Holmes’ brigade came up at a most critical period and helped to save the battle, whereas the fact is that Holmes did not arrive until the battle was over.
The troops actually engaged in this battle on our left, were the regiment and battalion with Evans, Bee’s brigade, Jackson’s’ brigade, Cocke’s brigade, three regiments of Elzey’s brigade, the three regiments with me, two regiments of Bonham’s brigade, Hampton’s Legion, the 49th Virginia Regiment, the artillery and a very few companies of cavalry – making about six complete brigades of infantry, besides the artillery and cavalry. Jackson’s brigade numbering about 2,500 muskets was probably the largest we had on the field.
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