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rail-road, and was entirely unused to marching. Our progress, therefore, was not as rapid as I would have wished, but we pushed on with all possible speed, the firing to the left being our only guide. Towards 3 o’clock P.M. we neared the field of battle, and began to perceive the scenes usual in rear of an army engaged in action. On entering the road leading from the field towards Manassas Junction, we met quite a stream of strag= glesrs going to the rear and were informed by them that every thing was over with us. I was riding by the side of Col. Kemper at the head of the column, and we had the satis= faction of being informed that if we went on the field on horseback, we would certainly be killed, as the enemy shot all the mounted officers. All of the men said their regiment had been entirely cut to pieces, and it was of no use for them to remain any longer. It was to the encouraging remarks of this stream of recreants that my command was exposed as it moved in. Only one man proffered to go back, and he belonged to the 4th Alabama regiment. He fell into the ranks of Kemper’s regiment and I suppose continued with it. On our getting near the field of battle, Colonel John S Reston, a volunteer aide of General Beauregard, rode to meet us and informed me that the General had gone to the front to conduct an at= tack on the enemy, but that General Johnston was on that part of the field and would give me instructions. He pointed out the direction in which the latter was,

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rode towards us, as soon he discovered our approach, and expressed his gratification at our arrival. I asked him at once to show me my position, to which he replied that he was too much engaged to do that in person, but that he would give me directions as to what I was to do.

He then ordered me to move to our extreme left and attack the enemy on his right, stating that by directing my march along the rear of our line, by the sound of the firing in front, there could be no mistake; and he cautioned me to take special pains to clear our whole line before advancing to the front, and be particular and not fire on any of our own troops, which he was sorry to say had been done in some instances. While General Johnston was speaking to me, quite a squad of men approached us going to the rear. and the General after asking them what regiment they be= longed to and where they were going, told me to make my men charge bayonets on them and drive them back to the front. I immediately ordered Colonel Kemper to make his men charge them and I threatened to shoot some of them with my pistols, when they commenced making excuses, saying they were sick or wounded. I saw at once that no fight was in them and I ordered Colonel Kem= per not to delay bothering with such cowards but to move on.

In front of us was a strip of woods extending towards our left, and we moved on in rear of this with heavy firing still in our front, or rather to our right as we moved. Affairs now were a very gloomy aspect in the rear, and the indications appeared to be that the day was

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going against us. About this time Colonel Kemper pointed out to me the Untied States flag floating in the distance on some high point, probably the top of a house. From that moment, I have looked with mortal aversion on that flag, once the banner of freedom, but now the symbol of tyranny and cruelty. To clear our line entirely, I found that it was necessary to pass entirely to the left of the woods in which our troops were, and as I approached the fields beyond, a messenger from Colonel J.E.B. Stuart (afterwards Genl Stuart), who was on our extreme left with two companies of cavalry and a battery of ar= tillery, came galloping to me with the information that the enemy was about giving way, and that the Colonel said if we would hurry up the enemy would soon be in retreat. This was the first encouraging news we had received since nearing the field of battle. I was then hurrying on as rapidly as the condition of my men, who were much blown, would permit, and I directed my march to an open field immediately on the left of the woods, where the fire of musketry was still heard. The messenger from Colonel Stuart now returned, and stated that the Colonel said the enemy had only retired his left behind behind a cleared ridge in my front, and was moving another column still further to his right (our left); and he cautioned me to be on the lookout.

Having now cleared the woods entirely, I moved to the front for the purpose of forming line to meet the [cut off on scan] movement of the enemy. On getting into

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a field facing the ridge behind which the enemy was re= ported making a column, I ordered Colonel Kemper to form his regiment into line, and sent back orders for the other regiments to move up as rapidly as possible and form in eschellon on Kemper’s left. Just at this time I observed a body of our troops move from a piece of woods on my right to another in front, and this proved to be the left regiment of Elzey’s brigade. I soon heard a rapid fire open from the woods into which Elzey’s regiment had advanced, and a body of the enemy appeared on the crest of the ridge in my front with a line of skirmishers in its front. This ridge was the one on which was situated Chinn’s house, mentioned in all descriptions of the battle. It was a high ridge sloping off towards our right, and the enemy here had decidedly the advantage of position, as my troops had to form in low ground on one side of the ridge in full view of him. His skirmishers were about 400 yards in front of us and opened on us with long range rifles or [heinnie?] muskets. My other two regiments came up a rapidly as possible and formed as directed, Barksdale being in the center and Hays on the left. When they were forming into line by file, under the fire of the enemy’s sharpshooters, Kemper’s regiment commenced moving obliquely to the right, towards the woods into which Elzey’s troops had been seen to move, and I rode in front of it and halted the regiment, informing it that there were our troops in

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that woods, and pointing out the enemy on the crest of the ridge. I then rode to the other regiments to superin= tend their formations, when Colonel Kemper, finding the fire of the enemy, who was beyond the reach of our smooth-bores, very annoying to his men, moved rapidly to the front to the cover of a fence at the foot of the hill. As soon as Hays’ regiment was formed, I ordered an advance and Hays moved to the line occupied by Kemper, when the two regiments started up the slope of the hill. As we advanced the enemy disappeared behind the crest of the ridge, and while we were ascending it, Lieut. McDonald, acting aide to Colonel Elzey, came riding rapidly towards me and requested me not to fire on the troops in my front, stating that they consisted of the 13th Va. Regt. of Elzey’s brigade. I said to him “they have been firing on my men” – to which he replied “I know they have, but it is a mistake, it is the 13th Va. Regt. I recognized Colonel Hill and his horse.” This proved to be a mistake of Lieut. McDonald’s arising from a fancied re= semblence of a [....ted?] officer with the enemy to the Colonel of the 13th Va., which regiment did not reach the battle field at all. This information, however, caused me to halt my troops on the side of the hill and ride towards the crest, where I observed a regiment about 200 yards to my right in front of the woods in which Elzey’s troops were. The flag of this regiment was drooping around the staff, and I could not discern whether it was the United Sates or Confederate flag. This position statement of