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Battle of Manassas (or Bull Run) July 21st 1861

The largest organization in our army at the time were brigades, and each brigade commander received his orders di= rectly from head-quarters. Since the conference at Fairfax Station, when General Beauregard said the effective strength of his troops did not exceed 15,000, one regiment (the 1st North Carolina) had been sent off by reason of the expiration of its term of service, and the 7th Louisiana (Col Hays) had joined my brigade. Besides this, General Beauregard’s troops had been augmented within the last two or three days be the arrival of 6 companies of the 8th Louisiana, the 5th North Carolina Regt, the 11th North Carolina Volunteers, the 13th Mississippi, the 49th Virginia and Hampton’s Legion, the latter not being equal to a regiment. – His whole effective force herein

     probably

did not ^ vary much from the estimate placed on it at the time of the conference alluded to, as the measles and typhoid fever, which had begun to prevail, had reduced very much the strength of the regiment, especially among the Virginia troops. To re-inforce him, Holmes’ brigade had been ordered from Aquia Creek, and General Johnston’s troops were arriving by the Manassas gap rail-road, after some delay by reason of accidents or mismanagement on the road.

The position of Beauregard’s troops on the evening of the 21st. was very nearly the same as on the 18th. Very early on this evening the enemy opened fire from the heights on the north of Bull Run, and I soon received an order to occupy a position in rear of the pine-woods north of McLean’s house, so as to be ready to support Longstreet at Blackburn’s Ford or

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lines at McLean’s Ford. No artillery was attached to my brigade on this day, but shortly after I got into position I received a message from Captain Gibson that his company of Virginia Volunteers, unattached, was in my rear without orders, and I gave him permission to join the 7th Va., which he did.

The arrival of General Johnston in person, and the trans= portation of his troops had on the rail-road, had of course changed the plans communicated to us on the night of the 19th, but the changes had not been communicated to me, and I cannot therefore speak of them from personal knowledge. It was, herein, understood that, owing to the fact that General Beauregard had made himself entirely familiar with the surrounding country, and that General Johnston was not acquainted with it, the latter had deferred to the former in the direction of the movement of the troops during the battle.

After being for some time in the position to which I had been ordered, I received a request from General Longstreet for one of my regiments to be sent to him, and I sent him the 6 companies of the 24th Va. under Lt. Col. Hairston. A short time afterwards, I received a request for another regi= ment, and I carried the 7th Louisiana to Blackburn’s Ford, leaving Col Kemper with his regiment behind. On arriving at the Ford, I found that the whole of Longstreet’s brigade had been crossed over the Run, and was lying under cover of the opposite hills, awaiting some signal

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to advance against the enemy, who was in considerable force at the point beyond the ford occupied by him on the 18th, before his attack on that day. The 24th Va. was being crossed over to join Longstreet’s brigade, and the General ordered the 7th Louisiana to be formed in line in the strip of woods on the Southern bank of the stream, so as to cover the ford. The enemy was keep= ing up a continuous artillery fire which rendered the vi= cinity of the ford quite uncomfortable, but the troops across the Run were in a great measure under cover. After Hays’ regiment had been put in position, Gen= eral Longstreet went across the Run to reconnoiter, and in a short time returned and directed me to take Hays’ and Kemper’s regiments, cross below at McLean’s ford, and then move around and capture a battery to his right, which he said could be easily taken. I was informed by him that Jones had crossed the Run and was in the hills beyond Mclean’s Ford, likewise awaiting the signal to advance, and I was to move between him and the Run against the enemy’s battery. Hays’ regiment was moved back through the pines, on the direct road, and, its route being marked by the rising dust, the enemy directed his fire towards it, exploding a shell in the ranks and killing and wounding four or five men. The two regiments were moved to McLean’s Ford, and while they were crossing over and forming, I rode to a point beyond on the hill, where I observed a

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lookout in a tree, to ascertain the position of the battery I was to attack and the route over which I was to advance. While I was engaged in ascertaining this, Colonel Chisholm, a volunteer aide of General Beauregard, rode up and informed me that the General’s orders were that the whole of us should fall back across the Run to the south side. My recollection is that this was between 10 and 11 A.M., though it may have been a little after the latter hour. I informed Colonel Chisholm of the order I had received from General Longstreet, and he said that he had just come from General Long= street to whom he had delivered the order from General Beauregard, and that it [embraced?] me as well as the rest. I felt this as a reprieve from utter destruction, for I had discerned that the only route by which I could advance to the attack of the enemy’s battery, was along an open valley for some distance, and then up the side of a naked hill to the plain on which the battery was located, the greater part of the route being raked by the enemy’s guns. Besides, the lookout had informed me that a heavy body of infantry was in the woods near the battery. It turned out afterwards that this battery was supported by a brigade of infantry behind a heavy abattis of felled timber. An attempt to carry out my orders would very probably have entailed the annihilation or utter rout of my two regiments. Hence the countermanding order was our salvation.

After recrossing the ford, I sent Kemper’s regiment to its former position, and moved with Hays’ regiment up the Run to Blackburn’s Ford, as I thought General Longstreet probably desired its return. On reaching the ford the

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General informed me that he did not then require Hays’ regiment, but would retain the 24th with him. I then ordered Colonel Hays to move down the Run again to McLean’s Ford, and return by that route to the point at which Kemper was, so as to avoid the artillery fire while passing over the hill through the pines. I rode di= rectly to where Kemper was, and after being there a short time, I discovered clouds of dust about McLean’s Ford, which I recognized at once as produced by Jones’ brigade returning to its former position. Anticipating the probability of a mistake of Hays’ regiment for the enemy, I rode rap= idly to Jones’ position and found some of his men ta= king their places in some slight rifle pits in rear of the ford, while the General was looking with his field glasses at Hays’ regiment, which was advancing from the direction from which the enemy might be supposed to approach. I informed him of the facts and requested that his men be cautious against firing. As soon as this was done, General Jones asked me if I had received an order from General Beauregard directing that I should go to him with my brigade. On my replying in the negative, he informed me that he had received a note from Gene= ral Beauregard, in which it was stated that I was to go to him. He sent for the note which was in the hands of one of his staff officers, and showed it to me. The note was in pencil, and after directing the withdrawal across the Run, there was a direction at the foot of it in very nearly these words: “Send Early to me.”

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This was the only order I received to go to the left, and the time of its reception was somewhere between 12 N. and 1 P.M.* The note did not state where General Beauregard was, or to what point I was to go, but I knew that his position had been near Bonham’s position at Mitchells’s Ford, and that he was to be found somewhere to our left.

As soon as the order was received, I sent to Hays to move up as rapidly as possible, directed Kemper to get ready to move, sent a messenger to General Longstreet requesting the return of my other regiment, and directed my acting Assistant Adjutant General, Captain Gardner, to ride to Mitchell’s Ford and ascertain where General Beauregard was, as well as the route I was to pursue. The messenger sent to General Longstreet returned, and informed me that the General said there was a regiment in the Pines near me, which had been ordered to report to him, and that I could take that regiment in lieu of my own, to save time and prevent the exposure of both to the fire of the enemy’s artillery in passing to and from Black= burn’s Ford. In this arrangement I concurred, and I

• Note. In his official report, General Beauregard says that the

order to me was sent at 12, but did not reach me until 2 P.M.; and he says I arrived on the field about 3. This is a mistake about the time I received the order, and if I had not received it until 2, it would have been impossible for me to have reached the field by 3.

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found to my left, in the pines, the 13th Mississippi regi= ment under Colonel Barksdale, which had very recently arrived.

The Colonel readily assented to accompany me, and as soon as possible the command was started on the road towards Mitchell’s Ford. This was about or shortly after 1 P.M. On the way I met Captain Gardner, who returned with the information that General Beauregard had gone to the Lewis house, in the direction of the firing on our extreme left, and that I was to go there. On reaching General Bonham’s position, I was informed by him that the Lewis house was con= siderably to the left and that I would have to move through the fields, but he could not describe the exact locality of the house. I moved in the direction pointed out to me, and continued to press on to our left, through the fields, towards the firing in the distance, which we now discovered to be very heavy.

While we were moving on in this manner and trying to find the Lewis house, Captain Smith, an assistant in the Adjutant’s General’s office at General Beauregard’s head-quarters, passed us in a great hurry also looking for General Beauregard and the Lewis house. The Captain informed me that in= formation had been received at the junction that 6,000 of the enemy’s troops had crossed the Manassas Gap rail-road, and it was this information, which subsequently proved false, that he was going to communicate to the General. The day was excessively hot and dry. Hays’ regiment had been a good deal exhausted by the marching and countermarching about Blackburn’s Ford, and Barksdale’s regiment,

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