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On the sixth of September however, he abando[ned] his works and retired to Atlanta. Here properly ended the operations about Atlanta. Of the forces turned over to me nearly two months before and since that date, daily engaged in battle and skirmishes, with a greatly superior enemy there were re- maining effective, as shown by the [returns?] of the 20th of September. Infantry twenty seven thousand and thirty four (27,094) Cavalry ten thousand five hundred and forty three (10,543), Artillery two thousand seven hundred and sixty six (2,766). There had been sent to Mobile one Brigade of Infantry eight hundred (800) strong and to Macon three Battalions of [Arty?] eight hundred (800) strong The militia had increased as stated, but counting it the same as originally turned over, [ ? ], as against the aggregate turned over forty eight thousand seven hundred and fifty (48,750), present Forty thousand four hundred and three (40,403) sent off. Three thousand and one hundred (3,100) making an aggregate of forty three thousand five hundred and three (45,503) [ ? ] [ ? ] a total loss of all, of five thousand two hundred and forty seven (5,247) men. A serious question was now presented to me. The enemy would not certainly long remain idle. He had it in his power to continue his march to the South and force me to fall back upon Alabama for subsistence.
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could not hope to hold my position, The country being a plain had no natural strength nor was there any advantageous position upon which I could retire. Besides the morale of the army, greatly improved during the operations around Atlanta, [it?] had again become [impaired] in consequence of the recurrence of retreat, and the army itself was decreasing strength day by day. Something was absolutely demanded and I might judge that any advance at all promising success would go far to restore its fighting spirit. Thus I determined in consultation with the Corps Cmdrs, to turn the enemy’s right flank and attempt to destroy his communications and force him to [destroy At] retire from Atlanta. The operation of the Cavalry under Wheeler in Georgia and [Forest?] in Tennessee proved to me conclusively and beyond a doubt that all the Cavalry in the service could not permanently interrupt the railroad communications in the enemy’s rear, sufficiently to cause him to abandon his position.
To accomplish anything therefore, it became necessary for me to move with my entire force. Causing the iron to be [re]moved from the several railroads out of Atlanta for distances of forty miles and directing railroad stocks to be restored to the West Point Railroad, the movement to the left, [ ? ] that road began on the 18th of September. Arriving upon that road the army took position with the left touching the Chattahoochie River and covering that
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that road, where it remained several days to allow the accommodation of supplies at blue mountain and a [enfficiency?] with which to continue the movement. On the 29th of September it left the [bivouac?] near Palmetto Ga. with Jacksons Cavalry in its front. Brig Genl Iverson with his command being left in observation of the enemy in and around Atlanta, and
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[...dialily ?] about the city, the works already constructed for the defence of the place being almost wholly useless from their position, Stuart’s and Cheatham’s Corps to take position and construct works to defend the city, the former on the left and the latter on the right. The Artillery, under command of Brig General Shoup, was massed on the extreme right. Hardee was ordered to move with his Corps during the night of the 21st south on the McDonough road, crossing Entrenchment Creek at Cobbs Mills and to completely turn the left of McPherson’s Army. This he should do even should it be necessary to go to, or beyond Decatur. Wheeler, with his Cavalry, was ordered to move on Hardee’s right, both to attack at daylight or as soon thereafter as possible. As soon as Hardee succeeded in forcing back the enemy’s left, Cheatham was to take up the movement from his right and continue to force the whole from right to left, down Peachtree Creek; Stuart in like manner, to engage the enemy as soon as the movement became general. Hardee failed to entirely turn the enemys left as directed, took position and attacked his flank. His troops fought with spirit and determination, carrying several lines of entrenchments. Wheeler attacking on the right. Finding Hardee so hotly engaged and fearing that the enemy might concentrate upon him, I ordered Cheatham forward to create a diversion. Hardee held the ground he
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gained. Cheatham carried the enemy’s entrenchm[en] -ts on his front, but had to abandon these in consequence of the enfilade fire brought to bear upon him. Cheatham captured five (5) guns and five (5) or six (6) stands of Colors, and Hardee eight (8) guns and thirteen (13) stands of colors. While the grand results desired were not accomplished, the movement of McPherson upon my communications was entirely defeated, and no further effort was made in that direction at any time. The engagement greatly inspired the troops and revived their confidence. Here I regret to say, the brave and gallant Maj. General W.H.T. Walker was killed. The enemy withdrew his left to the Georgia Rail Road, and strongly entrenched himself, and here properly began the siege of Atlanta. It become apparent almost immediately that he would attack our left. He began to mass his forces in that quarter.
On the 28th it became manifest that the enemy desired to place his right on Utoy Creek. I desired to hold the Lickskillet Road and and accordingly ordered Lt. Genl Lee, who, on the 25th had relieved Maj. Genl. Cheatham from the command of the Corps formerly commanded by myself, to move his force as so to prevent the enemy from gaining that road. He was ordered to hold the enemy in check on a line nearly parallel to the Lickshillet Road, remaining through Ezra church. General Lee finding that
