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On the 26th of August the enemy abandoned his works on the extreme right and took up a line, the left resting in front of our works on the Dalton Railroad and the right extending to the railroad crossing on the river again he withdrew on the night of the 27th across Utoy Creek, throwing our Corps across the river to hold the railroad crossing and the intermediate points. His left [their?] rested on the Chattachoochie River Strongly fortified and extending across the West Point Rail road. The Corps defending the crossing of the Chattachoochie, his works on this side of the river and the obstacle formed by the Utoy and Camp creek, rendered it impossible for me to attack him with any probability of success between the river and railroad.

On the 30th it became known that the enemy was moving on Jonesboro with two Corps. I determined upon consultation with the Corps Commanders to move two corps to Jonesboro during the night, and to attack and drive the enemy at that point across Flint River. This I hoped would [draw] the attention of the enemy [in?] that direction and that he would abandon his works on the left so that I could attack him in flank, I remained in person with Stuarts Corps and the militia in [  ? ] [  ? ] Lee Corps moved accordingly Hardee in [  ? ] It was impressed upon

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Genl Ha[rdee] that the fate of Atlanta depended upon his success. Six hours before I had any information of the result of [the?] attack I ordered Lee to return in the direction of Atlanta to be ready to commence the movement indicated in the event of success and if unsuccessful to cover the evacuation of Atlanta which would then be compelled. As it turned out uns- -successful it allowed the enemy the op- portunity either to strike us as we marched out of Atlanta or to concentrate on Hardee. Lee’s Corps constituted a guard against the former, and I did not fear the distruction of Hardee before Stuart and Lee could join him, as his position on the ridge between two rivers, I thought strong in front and want of time would prevent the enemy from attacking him on flank. The small loss of Hardee’s corps and the much greater loss of the enemy show

         have

my views to ^ been correct. The attack at Jonesboro failed, through the number of men upon our side considerably exceeded that of the enemy. The vigor of the attack may be in some sort immagined when only fourteen hundred (1400) men were killed and wounded out of two corps engaged. The failure necessitated the evacuation of Atlanta. Twenty four thousand (24000) prisoners at Anderson- ville Ga in my rear compelled me to place

        between

the army in my them and the enemy

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thus preventing me at that time from moving upon his communications and destroying his depots of supplies at Marietta. A raid of cavalry could have easily released these prisioners and the federal commander was prepared to furnish the arms. Such a body of men, an army of [strife ?], could have overrun and devastated the country, form west Ga. to Savannah. The subsequent removal of the prisioners. by my request enabled me to make the movement on the enemys communications at a later period.

On the night of the 1st September we withdrew from Atlanta. A train of ordinance stores and some railroad stock had to be destroyed in consequence of the gross neglect of the Chief QMaster to obey the specific instructions given him touching their removal. He had ample time and means and nothing whatever ought to have been lost

On the 1st September Hardee’s corps was attacked in positions at Jones borough. The result was the loss of eight (8) guns and some prisoners. Hardee then retired to Lovejoy Station when he was passed by Stuarts and Lees corps. The militia numbering about three thousand (3000) under Maj Genl G. W. Smith was ordered to Griffin. It is proper to remark here that this officer rendered excellent and gallant service during the siege at Atlanta the union followed and took position in our