.NDE.MTE3NDU
[4]
article of clothing and equipment strewed
the ground in profusion.
Not one gun in four of ours would ex-
plode, so that all that we could do was to
stay and be slaughtered with as much forti-
tude as possible, until night closed he scene.
The 38th was badly cut up, being very badly
managed, but we lost but 4 killed, 23 wounded,
and 4 missing, owing to our leaders having
the judgment to place their men where such
as had serviceable pieces could do execution,
and have some protection from the overwhelming
fire of 60,000 rebels, entrenched as they were.
We finally made out, under Providence to
silence the rifle-pits which were visible, but
of course could do nothing with the redoubts
or Fort Magruder. Our artillery, having no
ammunition, were lying useless on the road,
and small arms were opposed unaided to gi-
gantic earth-works and heavy artillery.
The "chivalry" of the rebels in fleeing from
a place of such strength, when attacked by
less than half their number, the assailants
laboring under every disadvantage, is rather [underscored]
questionable. The backing out may have
been 'military strategy" of the first-water,
but we don't see it. ['don't see it' underscored] I suppose they will
tell their people that the place was of
as usual
no importance, &c., ^ but if they spend 6 or 8
months in fortifying such unimportant points,
they must intend to have "somebody hurt"
at the first place that is[underscored] of importance,
"in a strategic point of view."
I threw my Austrian rifle away in
disgust, not being able to fire it. I suc-
ceeded in finding a U. S. Harper's Ferry
rifled musket which is a splendid
weapon. Numbers of our boys secured those
pieces, & Austrians are at a heavy dis-
count. "They have been weighed in the balances, &
